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Since the turn of the 21st century, China has sped up the reform of the 
state-owned commercial bank, establishing the aim of reforming its equity 
system and of founding a modern bank system. Meanwhile reforms with 
shareholding system reform as their core are under way. The author holds that 
the reform of state-owned commercial banks is a complicated and arduous 
systems engineering, and the lack of effective incentive and restriction system 
for the high-ranking managers (i.e. the operators) has long been the main 
factor that holds up the realization of a real improvement in the efficiency and 
competition proficiency of China’s state-owned commercial banks. Therefore, 
the key to the reform of state-owned commercial banks is to focus on the 
incentive and restriction system for the operators.  
By using theories related to the incentive and restriction system for the 
manager, such as Transaction Cost Theory, Property Right Theory, Super 
Property Right Theory, Principal-Agent Theory and Management and 
Incentive Theory, the article makes research on current situation and existing 
problems of the incentive and restriction system for our state-owned 
commercial banks’ managers. The findings are as follows: due to the 
incomplete incentive and restriction system, option encouragement mechanism 
and long-term incentive system are not practiced in most state-owned 
commercial banks, which results in low contract gains and abundant gray 
income. There appear so-called “inside controlling system”, “post 
consumption”, “personal expense account” and “phenomenon of 59”. For 
state-owned commercial banks’ executives, the controlling power gains has 
substituted the reward mechanism, leading to the loss of state property and a 















advanced experience of commercial banks in Britain, America and Germany in 
corporate governance patterns, incentive and restriction system for the 
operators and yearly salary system, the author suggests the state-owned banks 
make attempts at the long-term incentive means, like yearly salary system, 
stock ownership and stock options, and at building a competitive market 
outside the bank. In the end, the author states the key to the reform of 
state-owned commercial banks is to establish and consummate the incentive 
and restriction system, including reward mechanism, controlling power 
mechanism, fame mechanism and market competition mechanism, so as to 
guard against risks and boost competition.  
   
Key words: State-owned Commercial Banks; Incentive and Restriction 














目  录 
目  录 






第一章  经营者激励约束机制的构成及理论基础 .....................5 
第一节  经营者的薪酬结构及理论基础.................................................5 
第二节  公司经营者控制权机制...........................................................11 
第三节  经营者的声誉机制...................................................................14 
第四节 竞争机制与市场对经营者的激励约束...................................17 
第二章  我国国有商业银行经营者激励约束现状及存在问题    
分析 ...............................................................................20 
第一节  国有商业银行经营者的收入构成和现状分析.......................20 
第二节  国有商业银行的内部控制现状...............................................26 
第三节  国有商业银行经营者声誉机制和市场竞争机制现状 ..........32 
第三章  国外商业银行经验借鉴................................................37 
第一节  国外商业银行激励约束机制及启示.......................................37 
第二节  国外年薪制的模式比较...........................................................42 
第四章  国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制的构建 ...............46 















第二节  国有商业银行经营者的控制权制衡.......................................49 
第三节  建立我国国有商业银行经营者的声誉机制和市场竞争  
机制...........................................................................................51 
参考文献 ........................................................................................57 
















I.   Topic Selection Background................................................................1 
II.   Documents Review .............................................................................1 
III.  Theoretical Basis and Research Methods............................................3 
IV.  Framework Structure...........................................................................3 
V.  Main Contribution and Deficiency .....................................................4 
Chapter 1  Constitution and Theoretical Basis of the 
Incentive and Restriction System for the 
Operators....................................................................5 
Section 1  Wage Structure of the Operators and Related Theoretical 
Basis...........................................................................................5 
Section 2  Controlling Power Mechanism for the Operators ..............11 
Section 3  Fame Mechanism for the Operators ....................................14 
Section 4  Competition Mechanism and the Market’s Incentive and 
Restriction System for the Operators ..................................17 
Chapter 2  Present Situation and Existing Problems of 
China’s State-owned commercial banks................20  
Section 1  Analysis on Wage Structure and Current Situation of the 
Executives of State-owned Commercial Banks...................20 
Section 2  Current Situation of State-owned Commercial Banks’ 
Inside Controlling System ....................................................26  
Section 3 Current Situation of Fame Mechanism and Market 
Competition of State-owned Commercial Banks ...............32  















Commercial Banks’ Incentive and Restriction 
System .......................................................................37  
Section 1 Foreign Commercial Banks’ Incentive and Restriction 
System and its Revelation.....................................................37  
Section 2  Two Patterns of Overseas Yearly Salary System.................42  
Chapter 4   The Constitution of the Incentive and 
Restriction System of State-owned Commercial 
Banks........................................................................46  
Section 1 A Suggestive Framework of  Compensation Incentive 
System for China’s State-owned Commercial Banks’ 
Operators ...............................................................................46 
Section 2  Check and Balance of Controlling Power Mechanism for 
State-owned Commercial Banks’ Executives .....................49  
Section 3  Setting up Fame Mechanism and Market Competition 
Mechanism for the State-owned Commercial Banks’ 
















导  论 
1 






















                                                        






































































































































第一章  经营者激励约束机制的构成及理论基础 
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第一章  经营者激励约束机制的构成及理论基础 
7 
（一） 优激励方案设计理论的委托----代理模型  
基于委托－代理理论，经营者的激励约束问题就是满足经营者“参与
约束”和“激励相容”约束的所有者目标函数 大化问题，即： 
max   ( ) ( )( )[ ]εωε ,, eeE ∏−∏  
( ) ( )( )[ ] 0,,.. UeeEUIRts ≥∏ εω  
( ) ( )( )[ ]eeEUIC ,,εω ∏  
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